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INTRODUCTION
Although this is the sixty-first year since the adoption of the
Communications Act' and it has been several years since AT&T's
* Director, State Regulatory Affairs/East, Sprint Communications Company L.P.,
Washington, D.C.; A.B. San Diego State University, 1978; M.B.A., J.D. University of San
Diego, 1982. The views in this Article are those of the Author and not necessarily those of
Sprint Communications Company L.P. or its affiliates. Copyright 01995 Craig D. Dingwall.
1. Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934) (codified in scattered
sections of 47 U.S.C.).
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divestiture of its local exchange carriers (LECs),2 state and federal
regulators and legislators are seemingly in a race to develop federal and
state policies governing local dial tone competition and alternative access
to customers in the so-called "last mile" of switching and local-loop
facilities. Notwithstanding the rhetoric about the perceived fast pace of
access and local exchange services competition,3 the Bell Operating
Companies (BOCs) still dominate the local exchange and control bottleneck
access facilities. Although corporate telecommunications takeovers were
valued at over $40 billion in 1994 and more mergers are predicted,4 the
touted information highway will be of little use to customers who have no
on-ramps to alternative service providers.
In the wake of the demise of Senate Bill 1822 last year' and the
House and Senate passing their respective telecommunications bills this
year,6 many states are now addressing a myriad of local competition issues
and are understandably not inclined to wait for possible future preemptive
federal legislation. Notwithstanding the significance of those telecommuni-
cations legislative reforms, many of the details for implementing switched
2. United States v. Am. Tel. & Tel., 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.C. Cir. 1982), aff'd sub
nom., Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983).
3. Local exchange service, as used in this Article, means the transmission and
utilization of switched two-way voice and voice-grade data communications and associated
usage. "'Interexchange telecommunications' means telecommunications between a point or
points located in one exchange telecommunications area and a point or points located in one
or more other exchange areas or a point outside an exchange area." Am. TeL & Tel., 514
F. Supp. at 229. As defined in the Modification of Final Judgment (MFJ), an exchange area
or an exchange is a geographic area established by a BOC in accordance with the following
criteria:
(1) any such area shall encompass one or more contiguous local exchange areas serving
common social, economic, and other purposes, even where such configuration transcends
municipal or other local governmental boundaries;
(2) every point served by a BOC within a state shall be included within an exchange
area;
(3) no such area which includes part or all of one standard metropolitan statistical area
... shall include a substantial part of any other standard metropolitan statistical area...
unless the Court shall otherwise allow; and
(4) except with approval of the Court, no exchange area located in one state shall
include any point located within another state. Id. at 229.
Telephone exchange service is generally defined as "service within a telephone
exchange, or within a connected system of telephone exchanges within the same exchange
area operated to furnish to subscribers inter-communicating service of the character
ordinarily furnished by a single exchange, and which is covered by the exchange service
charge." 47 U.S.C. § 153(r) (1982).
4. TelecommunicationsMergersEclipseDrug Industry in 1994Activity, COMM. DAILY,
Jan. 3, 1995, at 1, 1-2.
5. S. 1822, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994).
6. S. 652, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995), H.R. 1555, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
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local competition have been and will continue to be determined by the
states. State regulators have an in-depth knowledge of their local markets
and can develop policies that fit the unique characteristics of individual
states. While many state/local competition regulatory proceedings and
legislative proposals are pending to address such important and complex
issues as collocation, interconnection rates, universal service funding, and
number portability and assignment, the daunting possibility of a patchwork
of varying state/local competition rules suggests the need for a consistent
national approach and collaboration, where feasible, to develop uniform
local competition requirements and safeguards. Sweeping federal telecom-
munications legislation, if adopted, will require further regulatory work,
oversight, and significant network and technical changes in the states to
implement local competition policies.
The need for consistent, procompetitive regulatory policies is critical
for service providers attempting to develop national and international
strategies and for consumers who demand easy access and seamless
interconnection for a variety of services, as they travel among different
states and countries. This Article reviews some of the many impediments
and proposed solutions for a fully competitive local telecommunications
market.
I. BACKGROUND
The consent decree (Decree) entered in United States v. American
Telephone & Telegraph mandated the divestiture of local telephone
operating companies from AT&T into BOCs. The Decree divided the
country into 164 Local Access and Transport Areas (LATAs), and, subject
to certain exceptions, allows BOCs to provide telecommunications services
within LATAs (intraLATA) but not between them (interLATA).8 This
restriction may be removed "upon a showing by the petitioning BOC that
there is no substantial possibility that it could use its monopoly power to
impede competition in the market it seeks to enter."9 To date, this standard
has not been satisfied, and the interexchange (interLATA) line of business
7. Am. TeL & Tel., 552 F. Supp. at 178-79.
8. The MFJ also required interLATA equal access for all competitors, and imposed
line-of-business restrictions prohibiting Regional Bell Operating Companies (RBOCs) from
engaging in the provision of interexchange services, information services, manufacturing
telecommunications products and customer premises equipment, marketing such equipment,
and advertising directories. Id. at 186. The information service ban was lifted in 1993.
United States v. Western Elec. Co., 993 F.2d 1572, 1579 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
9. Am. Tel. & Tel., 552 F. Supp. at 231.
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restriction remains substantially in place."0
In 1993, Rep. Jack Brooks (D-Tex.) and Rep. John Dingell (D-
Mich.) introduced House Bill 3626, which provided several dates after
which BOCs may petition the Attorney General and the Federal Comnimuni-
cations Commission (FCC or the Commission) for permission to provide
services restricted by the Modified Final Judgment (MFJ).11 The House
of Representatives passed House Bill 3626 on June 28, 1994. House
Telecommunication Subcommittee Chairman Edward Markey (D-Mass.)
and Rep. Jack Fields (R-Tex.) sponsored House Bill 3636,12 which would
have required local phone companies to allow competitors to have access
to their networks. Neither bill passed the Senate.
The Senate Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committee
approved a telecommunications reform bill (Senate Bill 1822), sponsored
by Sen. Ernest Hollings (D-S.C.), on August 11, 1994.13 Senate Bill
1822, which would have required that BOCs face substantial competition
in their local telephone market before they could offer long-distance
services, was pronounced dead on September 24, 1994, due to BOC
opposition and other factors. 14
With the Senate and the House this year passing their sweeping
telecommunications bills, Senate Bill 652 and House Bill 1555, respec-
tively, the spotlight now shifts to President Clinton, who has threatened to
veto House Bill 1555 unless several provisions are deleted or revised.
President Clinton is reportedly concerned that House Bill 1555 would allow
an "excessive number of in-region buyouts between telephone companies
and cable (TV) operators, substituting consolidation for competition and
leaving customers in small towns with no rate protection in most cases and
no foreseeable expectation of competition."15 The 188-vote House margin
on House Bill 1555 and the 63-vote Senate margin on Senate Bill 652 are
wide enough to sustain vetoes. Moreover, as of the publication deadline for
this article, Senate Bill 652 and House Bill 1555 have not yet gone to the
10. Although Judge Greene recently allowed BOCs to resell long-distance services to
their cellular customers subject to certain conditions, such as separate marketing arms for
long-distance service, certification that local cellular markets are competitive, and
distribution of business among more than one long-distance provider. United States v.
Western Elec. Co., No. 82-0192, slip op. at 1 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 28, 1995).
11. H.R. 3626, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
12. H.R. 3636, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
13. S. 1822, supra note 5.
14. Edmund L. Andrews, Bill to Revamp Communications Dies in Congress, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 24, 1994, § 1, at 1.
15. House Telecom Bill Pleases Cable TV, Telco Interests; Conference Committee
Wrangling Still Expected, THE CABLE-TELco REP., Aug. 11, 1995, at 1, 2.
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Conference Committee and further changes to these bills are likely.
The significant debates regarding various draft bills revolved around
simultaneous local, cable, and interexchange competition on a date specific,
versus federal oversight and review over a checklist of requirements and
safeguards to determine whether the local exchange is competitive prior to
BOCs providing interexchange service. As noted above, cable deregulation
is also a critical issue as cable companies strive to expand their services
into telephony.
Under the Decree and existing legislation, the states continue to
regulate intrastate telecommunications matters, including intrastate
intraLATA and local competition issues. As discussed below, several state
commissions and legislatures have local competition issues pending before
them, and the results to date have been mixed.
II. DESPITE INTENSE LONG-DISTANCE COMPETITION, LOCAL
AND SWITCHED ACCESS TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES ARE
NOT YET COMPETITIVE.
Competition promotes better products and services produced more
efficiently, at lower prices and reduced costs. Accordingly, intense
competition in the long-distance market has brought consumers better
services at lower costs. AT&T's share of the overall market for interstate
minutes has declined from more than 80 percent in late 1984 to 58 percent
in the third quarter of 1994.16 Adjusted for inflation, the average revenue
per minute of the major interexchange carriers (IXCs) has fallen by over
63 percent since 1985, while the average cost per minute of long-distance
calling has decreased from forty-one cents to fourteen cents since
divestiture in constant 1993 dollars. 7 Despite reductions in revenue per
minute among major IXCs, AT&T recently reported its best long-distance
and equipment revenues since the 1984 divestiture. 8 Since 1988, competi-
16. FCC, LONG DISTANCE MARKET SHARES, THIRD QUARTER 1994 3-4 (1995).
17. ROBERT E. HALL, LONG DISTANCE: PUBLIC BENEFITS FROM INCREASED
COMPETITION 8 (1993); MCI TELECOMMUNICATIONS CORPORATION, PRESERVING LONG
DISTANCE COMPETITION AND PROMOTING LOCAL COMPETITION: 21ST CENTURY
TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY 1-7 (1994) [hereinafter PRESERVING LONG DISTANCE
COMPETITION]. Sprint announced that it will give customers a flat rate of 100 per minute
for calls anywhere in the U.S. between the hours of 7 p.m. and 7 a.m., while MCI unveiled
steeper price cuts which can cut the cost of a long-distance call by as much as 50% and a
repackaged version of its Friends & Family plan. John J. Keller, MCI and Sprint Unveil
Deep Discounts, New Services in Fresh Fight With AT&T, WALL ST. J., Jan. 6, 1995, at
A3.
18. John J. Keller, AT&T Posts Surge in Profitfor 4th Period, WALL ST. J., Jan. 25,
1995, at A3.
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tion in the long-distance markets has reduced annual long-distance charges
by more than $20 billion, while AT&T's, MCI's, and Sprint's long-
distance calling volumes have grown by nearly 80 percent in the last five
years. 9 Moreover, according to a Yankee Group survey, approximately
16.6 percent or 16.1 million U.S. households changed their long-distance
carriers within the past year." Studies have also shown that intraLATA
toll rates are lower in states that have introduced competition or eliminated
the barriers to intraLATA toll competition.2' While access charges have
dropped since divestiture, more than half of the reduction in long-distance
prices is due to factors other than access charge reductions. '
In light of the experience in the interexchange long-distance market,
competition in the local exchange market will likely produce similar
benefits, including a choice of local telephone company, lower prices,
better service quality, and new services and features. Notwithstanding the
benefits of a competitive market, the markets for local exchange and
switched access services are not yet competitive. BOCs currently hold
almost the entire market share for local exchange services,' and, with
limited exceptions, most customers still do not have access to alternative
local exchange service providers. Competitive access providers (CAPs)
generally provide dedicated, high-capacity access services to a limited
number of buildings in a handful of cities, and account for less than 1
percent of intrastate or interstate access revenues.24 During the first six
19. Investigation by the Dep't on its own motion into IntraLATA and Local Exchange
competition in Massachusetts:Before the MassachusettsDep 't of Pub. Util., D.P.U. 94-185,
9, May 19, 1995 (Sprint Comm. Co. L.P. Testimony of Mark Sievers) [hereinafter
Sievers's Testimony].
20. THE YANKEE GROUP, CONSUMER LONG DISTANCE: THE BATTLE FOR SIMPLICITY
AND DIFFERENTIATION 7 (1995).
21. See, e.g., Alan D. Mathios & Robert P. Rogers, The Impact and Politics of Entry
Regulation on Long Distance Rates, 2 J. REG. ECON. 53 (1990). See also FCC, THE
EFFECT OF COMPETITION AND REGULATION ON AT&T'S INTRASTATE TOLL PRICES, AND
OF COMPETITION ON BELL OPERATING COMPANY INTRALATA TOLL PRICES (staff report
authored by Chris Frentrup) (1988).
22. Hall, supra note 17, at 10; PRESERVING LONG DISTANCE COMPETITION, supra note
17, at 111-8.
23. Nancy Hass, Betting on MCI? Don't Bury the Bells Just Yet, NEWSwEEK, Jan. 17,
1994, at 38, 38; Jeffrey Walker, Note, Missed Connections: One Failed Attempt to Ease
Restrictions on Bell Operating Companies, 47 FED. COMM. L.J. 439, 451 (1994).
24. FCC, TELECOMMUNICATIONSINDUSTRY REVENUE: TRS FUND WORKSHEET DATA
Table 2 (staff report authored by Jim Lande) (1994) [hereinafter TELECOMMUNICATIONS
INDUSTRY REVENUE]; Amicus Brief for the United States of America at 24-25 (Opposition
of Sprint Comm. Co. L.P.), United States of America v. Western Electric Co., Inc. and
Am. Tel. and Tel. Co., (D.C. Cir. 1994) (C.A. No. 82-0192 (I-HG)) [hereinafter Sprint
Opposition]. See Antitrustand Communications ReformAct of 1993: Hearings on H.R. 3626
Before the Subcomm. on Econ. and Com. Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d
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months of 1993, only .45 percent of Sprint's payments for local access
went to alternative access providers,' while only .14 and .6 percent of
AT&T's and MCI's access payments, respectively, went to CAPs in
1992.' Not surprisingly, the BOCs' ratio of cash flow to sales from 1985
through 1993 was 31.5 percent as compared to 22.9 percent for other S &
P Telecommunications Companies. According to a recent FCC Common
Carrier Bureau report titled Common Carrier Competition, LECs continue
to earn 97 percent of all access revenues-about the same percentage as the
old Bell System's share of toll revenues in 1981 .
While intense competition in the long-distance market has produced
significant benefits for consumers, the local telecommunications market is
not yet effectively competitive. According to an Economic Strategy Institute
(ESI) study, Ensuring Competition in the Local Exchange, it will be at least
five years before a majority of U.S. residents have an alternative to their
current LEC's offerings.29 According to the ESI study, during the
transition to competitive markets, the BOCs still will control six regulatory
"choke points"-local number portability, network unbundling, network
interconnection, local exchange service resale, reciprocal compensation for
terminating traffic, and universal service support mechanism reforms-each
of which could forestall local exchange service competition.3' The ESI
study further shows that local competition is "effectively nonexistent when
compared with interexchange competition." 3 ESI contends in its report
that most states have not yet adopted regulatory frameworks for providing
CAP-telco interconnection at nondiscriminatory prices. Cellular services
and personal communications services (PCS) are not yet cost-effective
alternatives to incumbent telcos' wireline carrier access services in most
areas. Cable TV operators must overcome numerous technical hurdles
before they can begin using coaxial cable plants for switched local
Cong., 2d Sess. 40 (1994) (statement of William T. Esrey, Chairman and Chief Executive
Officer of Sprint Corp.).
25. Sprint Opposition, supra note 24, at 24.
26. Id. (citing testimony of Robert Allen, AT&T Chairman, before the Senate Comm.
on Commerce, Science and Transportation, Sept. 8, 1993).
27. WILLIAM PAGE MONTGOMERY, BELL COMPANIES' ASSESSMENT OF LOCAL
COMPETITION 15-16 (1994).
28. LECs Earn 97% of Access Revenues, FCC Says, TELECOMM. REP., June 5, 1995,
at 26, 26 (citing LAWRENCE CHIMERINE ET AL., ECONOMIC STRATEGY INSTITUTE,
ENSURING LOCAL COMPETITION IN THE LOCAL EXCHANGE (1995)).
29. Study Sees Ongoing Barriers to Local Competition, TELECOMM. REP., July 17,
1995, at 14, 14 (citing FCC, COMMON CARRIER COMPETITION (1995)).
30. Id.
31. Experts See Long Local Competition Gestation; States Still Act, STATE TEL. REG.
REP., June 29, 1995, at 1, 8.
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exchange phone services, and cable TV companies face an upgrade cost of
approximately $1200 per subscriber to provide telephone service.3
2
Several regulatory and technical barriers need to be addressed, and
safeguards should be implemented to promote local telecommunications
competition.
III. SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENTS AND REMAINING CHALLENGES
A. Background
Although states now allow 10XXX intrastate, intraLATA toll
competition,33 only a few state commissions have authorized switched
local dial tone competition and have made any significant progress in
actually implementing substantial local competition.' For example, the
Maryland Public Service Commission approved the applications by MFS,
MCI, and Teleport to provide local telecommunications services to business
customers. 35 Yet, further work remains to be done in developing perma-
nent, cost-based, reciprocal intercarrier compensation arrangements.
Similarly, the New York Public Service Commission (NYPSC) recently
32. Id.
33. With 1OXXX intraLATA competition, short-haul toll calls originating and
terminating within the same LATA may be completed over an IXC's facilities by dialing
a 1OXXX code. Some states, such as New York, have also approved 1 +intraLATA toll
competition, whereby callers can place intraLATA toll calls over their carrier of choice by
dialing 1 + the area code and the telephone number.
34. The state commissions in Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Iowa, Illinois, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Michigan, New York (effective Jan. 1, 1996), Ohio, Pennsylvania,
Tennessee, Utah (effective May 1, 1996), and Washington permit switched local exchange
service, although interconnection terms and other local competition issues are still pending
in many of these states. Additionally, state legislation in Colorado, Iowa, Hawaii, Oregon,
Minnesota, North Carolina, Texas, Virginia, and Wyoming may open these states' switched
local-exchange markets to competition in 1996. The California Public Utility Commission
adopted interim rules authorizing switched local competition effective Jan. 1, 1996.
However, further work remains to be done on several key issues such as unbundling
requirements, LEC resale restrictions, and compensation for interim number portability. See
Local Competition Advances Like Wildfire in Western States, STATE TEL. REG. REP., July
27, 1995, at 1, 3-5; Majority of Eastern States Build Stable Local Competition Base, STATE
TEL. REG. REP., July 13, 1995, at 3, 8-9.
35. Application of MFS Intelnet of Maryland, Inc. for Authority to Provide and Resell
Local Exchange and Interexchange Telephone Service; and Requesting the Establishment
of Policies and Requirements for the Interconnection of Competing Local Exchange
Networks; In re the Investigation by the Comm'n on its own Motion into Policies Regarding
Competitive Local Exchange Tel. Serv. (Case No. 8594), Order No. 71155, State of
Maryland Pub. Serv. Comm'n, Phase II (Apr. 25, 1994) (addressing local service and
reciprocal interconnection costs by approving the applications of MFS, MCI, and TCG to
provide local service to business customers in Maryland for an interim 6.1c per call (2.20
per minute) inter-carrier compensation rate) [hereinafter Maryland Pub. Serv. Comm'n].
[Vol. 48
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approved Frontier Corporation's (formerly Rochester Telephone) so-called
Open Market Plan, which divided Frontier's local exchange operations in
Rochester into two subsidiaries: R-Net, a price-cap regulated network
operator, and R-Com, a lightly regulated retail service provider. 6
However, the Open Market Plan fails to address some critical implementa-
tion issues (e.g., full number portability and access to rights-of-way), and
it is subject to modification pending the outcome of the New York PSC's
ongoing Competition II proceeding.37 Moreover, most new entrants to the
Rochester local exchange marketplace are essentially reselling the
incumbent LEC's local service at a discount, rather than bringing actual
facility-based local competition to the marketplace.
Critics of the Open Market Plan further argue that resellers are
hamstrung by wholesale rates that are only 5 percent below the incumbent's
retail rates and do not allow resellers to recover their marketing, billing,
collection, and operation costs. 38 Opponents of the Open Market Plan also
contend that the amount Frontier charges interconnectors for access to an
unbundled local loop is higher than the amount it charges end users for the
equivalent part of a bundled service package. They also complain about
excessive charges for construction of cages for interconnectors' physically
collocated equipment, excessive rates for DS1 and voice-grade cross-
connects, and refusal to provide online access to directory assistance and
toll-free 800-number databases.39
So far, Frontier Corporation has benefited from the Open Market
Plan. Based upon 1995 first quarter results, Frontier's revenue increased
4.2 percent to $283 million from $272 million; net income grew to $25.5
million-almost a 25 percent jump from the same quarter a year earlier;
and earnings per share rose from twenty-three cents to thirty-eight cents
36. Petition of Rochester Tel. Corp. for Approval of Proposed Restructuring Plan (Case
93-C-0103) and Petition of Rochester Tel. Corp. for Approval of a New Multi Year Rate
Stability Agreement (93-C-0033), Opinion & Order Approving Joint Stipulation and
Agreement, State of New York Pub. Serv. Comm'n, Op. No. 94-25 (Nov. 10, 1994) [here-
inafter Open Market Plan or Plan]. The New York Commission also recently approved
AT&T's, Time Warner's, and Frontier Communications' local dial tone tariffs to provide
local service in Rochester, New York. Several other potential competitors already have
intracity authority throughout New York State.
37. Examination of Issues Related to Continuing Provision of Universal Service et al.,
Proceeding on Motion of the Commission (94-C-0095), (Order Instituting Proceeding) State
of New York Pub. Serv. Comm'n, (Feb. 10, 1994).
38. Doubts Surface about Rochester 'Open Market Plan Critics Say Competition
Experiment is Sputtering, TELECOMM., Aug. 14, 1995, at 8, 8-9.
39. Id. at 9-10.
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during the year.' In addition, Frontier's number of access lines increased
1.3 percent after one quarter under the Plan.4" Frontier announced that a
14.7 percent increase in long-distance revenue and an 11.7 percent gain in
the local communications services segment fueled its improved results.42
Nevertheless, two Illinois Commerce Commission hearing examiners
recommended rejection of Ameritech's proposal to open its local telephone
exchange to competition concurrent with BOC entry into the long-distance
market.43 The hearing examiners expressed concerns similar to those
noted by opponents of the Open Market Plan, including the lack of number
portability and the lack of local competition." In response, Ameritech
endorsed the hearing examiners' proposal for implementation of switched
local service competition in Illinois, including network unbundling,
intraLATA toll presubscription, and local number portability.4 5
The Illinois Commerce Commission later cancelled and annulled
Illinois Bell Telephone's "Customers First" tariff filings and ordered the
company to file new tariffs for the provision of unbundled services,
interconnection and reciprocal compensation, and other matters.' A staff
report showed that the unbundled network component tariff elements
appeared to be priced below their cost.47 The Illinois Commerce Commis-
sion required that the sum of unbundled loop, port, and monthly connection
charges be less than or equal to the charge for a network access line. This
raised concerns that other elements, particularly collocation and interim
number portability charges, could be overpriced to compensate for the low
network component prices."
40. Frontier Boosts Market Share in First Quarter of Open Market Plan, LOCAL
COMPETITION REP., May 1, 1995, at 8, 8.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Frederick H. Lowe, Ameritech Rebuffed by State Commission, CHI. SUN-TIMES,
Jan. 26, 1995, at 44.
44. Id.
45. Ameritech Supports Illinois Interconnection Proposals, Suggests Timetable for
Unbundling, Presubscription, TELECOMM. REP., Feb. 13, 1995, at 5, 5.
46. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., Proposed introduction of a trial of Ameritech's Customers
First Plan in Illinois (94-0096); Ill. Bell Tel. Co., Addendum to proposed introduction of
a trial of Ameritech's Customers First Plan in Illinois (94-0117); AT&T Comm. of Illinois,
Inc., Petition for an investigation and Order establishing conditions necessary to permit
effective exchange competition to the extent feasible in areas served by Illinois Bell Tel. Co.
(94-0146); Illinois Bell Tel. Co., Proposed introduction of a trial of Ameritech's Customers
First Plan in Illinois (refiled) (94-0301 Consol.), Order, Illinois Commerce Comm'n (Apr.
7, 1995) (order cancelling trial of Ameritech's "Customers First" plan in Ill.).
47. Shira McCarthy, Ameritech Feels Heat on Open Network Plan, TELEPHONY, July
3, 1995, at 8, 8.
48. Id.
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The U.S. Department of Justice supported the Ameritech proposal,
which allows Ameritech to resell long-distance service in exchange for
unbundling local loops, offering dialing parity, and providing number
portability. Although AT&T requested that Illinois and Michigan regulators
allow it to offer local service as part of the Ameritech trial, initially AT&T
will likely resell Ameritech, GTE, and Centel service as it does with
respect to Frontier's local service in Rochester.
The results among state legislatures are equally mixed. As noted
above, several states recently passed local competition legislation.49 Most
state legislative measures require all local market entrants, including local
resellers, to obtain state certification by showing they have the capability
and resources to provide service. Many state/local competition legislative
measures-including those from Iowa, North Carolina, Utah, and
Virginia-also require the state commission to find that certification is in
the public interest.' Moreover, most state/local competition legislative
measures permit the state commissions to adopt lenient regulation of new
local entrants' rates. Additionally, legislative measures generally charge
state regulators with (1) developing permanent local competition rules
addressing unbundled interconnection to essential facilities and competitive
equity issues such as local number portability, (2) abolishing prohibitions
against resale of switched local exchange service, (3) establishing a
financial support system for universal service, and (4) adopting alternative
price-based regulation of incumbent telephone companies, with significant
variation in how to structure telco price-regulation systems."1 Despite
these similarities, there are many differences among state legislative
measures regarding the effective dates of local competition,52 the specific
type and duration of price regulation, the exemptions for small telcos per
number of access lines,53 and the required LEC infrastructure investments.
While some states have made progress in addressing critical local
49. States include Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Iowa, Minnesota,
New Hampshire, North Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Wisconsin, and
Wyoming.
50. Analysis of 1995 State Competition Laws Shows 7 Similarities, STATE TEL. REG.
REP., June 1, 1995, at 1, 3.
51. Id. at 3-5.
52. For example, local competition is authorized in Florida and Virginia effective Jan.
1, 1996, while resale competition is allowed in Texas following tariff approval within 180
days of Sept. 1, 1995. Twelve States PassLocal Competition Legislation, TELECOMM. REP.,
June 12, 1995, at 8, 8-9.
53. For example, Florida exempts LECs with less than 100,000 access lines from
competition until 2001. North Carolina restricts local competition for LECs with fewer than
200,000 access lines unless the LEC elects price regulation, and New Hampshire restricts
competitor entry where LECs have less than 25,000 lines. Id.
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competition issues, much work remains to be done before effective local
and switched access competition becomes a reality. Just as it has taken
years for new entrants to gain market share in the interexchange market,
local competition will not happen overnight and thus far has been mired in
litigation and delay. Actual, effective, facilities-based local competition
must precede BOC entry into the interLATA telecommunications market,
and minimum safeguards are necessary to promote effective local
competition. At a recent press briefing, Anne K. Bingaman, U.S.
Department of Justice, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust, correctly
rejected "date-certain" and "market-share-test" approaches to lifting
interLATA line-of-business restrictions, and instead endorsed a "middle
ground" involving case-by-case Justice Department analysis of each local
service market.' Ms. Bingaman said that the Justice Department will
support interLATA service waiver requests only when the following three
basic principles are met: (1) "Steps to foster the emergence of local
competition must be taken in particular states;" (2) "The effectiveness of
those steps must be tested by actual marketplace facts, by an assessment by
the Department of Justice of the state of competition in a particular...
market;" and (3) "BOC participation in those [interLATA] markets must
be accompanied by appropriate safeguards."' In addition to removing
legal barriers to local competition, Ms. Bingaman called for the following
prerequisites for instituting local competition: interconnection and
recriprocal compensation for terminating traffic, network unbundling and
resale of local services, intraLATA toll-call dialing parity, implementation
of local number portability, and arrangements for new market entrants to
obtain pole attachments and access to conduits.56
Similarly, IXCs, CAPs, and others have advocated eliminating
franchise restrictions and existing subsidies, gaining access to customers,
funding universal service, obtaining number portability and dialing parity,
providing cost-based intercarrier compensation, and implementing
differential regulation as preconditions for an effectively competitive
market." The Pressler Bill, Senate Bill 652,8 which Majority Leader
Dole (R-Kan.) noted as "the most important bill [the Senate] has considered
54. Bingaman Offers DoJ Support for InterLATA Waivers; Approval Conditioned on
Local Competition, TELECOMM. REP., Mar. 6, 1995, at 5, 5-7 [hereinafter Bingaman
Speech]. See also Viveca Novak & Daniel Pearl, Bells Get Boost in Bid to Offer Long
Distance, WALL ST. J., Mar. 1, 1995, at A3, A6.
55. Bingaman Speech, supra note 54, at 5.
56. Id. at 6.
57. See, e.g., Sievers's Testimony, supra note 19.
58. S. 652, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
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all year," addresses many of these critical components. Among the safe-
guards are nondiscriminatory access on an unbundled basis to Bell network
functions and services that are "equal in type, quality and price" to what
a Bell offers itself; white pages listing of a competitor's customer numbers;
access to 911, directory assistance, BOC databases, and network signalling;
local-loop transmission; unbundled local switching; dialing parity;
recriprocal compensation for origination and termination of local telephone
calls; and resale of local service.5 9 While these safeguards are not
exhaustive, they are some of the minimum requirements necessary for local
competition to develop.
Regrettably, Senate Bill 652 and House Bill 1555 do not include a
critical, strong oversight antitrust role for the Department of Justice in
reviewing Bell company proposals to enter the long-distance market. Until
recently, IXCs generally favored the House Bill insofar as it would have
forced regional Bell companies to "open their monopoly local phone
markets to a competitor with their own networks before they could offer
long-distance."' As passed in the House, House Bill 1555 would allow
the BOCs to "enter the long-distance market without first having to show
that their local phone systems face widespread competition. "61 Specifical-
ly, House Bill 1555 would allow BOCs to enter the long-distance market
more easily by enabling them to apply for market entry after six months
without having a facilities-based competitor.62 This reduces the amount of
time in which the FCC has to draw up a checklist of items to gauge local
phone competition to only six months.63 House Bill 1555 would also
remove the requirement of resale at "economically feasible" wholesale
prices, limiting the role of the Department of Justice to determine BOC
entry into the, long-distance market, and changing joint-marketing rules to
let more small long-distance firms partner with the BOCs.' Also, unlike
Senate Bill 652, House Bill 1555 would sunset BOC separate subsidiary
requirements after eighteen months. The potential adverse effects of House
59. FCC REPORT, BILL's JOuRNEY OF MANY STEPs LEADs TO BELL LONG-DISTANCE
ENTRY 13-14 (1995).
60. Barbara Woller, Bedlam SurroundsDeregulation Bills, USA TODAY, July 11, 1995,
at 4B.
61. Long-Distance Companies Can't Get Through to Congress in Telecommunications
Bill Debate, WALL ST. J., July 24, 1995, at A14.
62. RHCs, Gingrich Pushing for Summer Telecom Vote; JXCs Say They Can't Support
Revised Measure, TELECOMM. REP., July 24, 1995, at 1, 1-2 [hereinafter Summer Telecom
Vote].
63. Id. See also Phone Competition Rules in House Bill Could Be Reworked by GOP,
INvEsTORs Bus. DAILY, July 17, 1995, at A4 [hereinafter Phone Competition].
64. See Summer Telecom Vote, supra note 62, at 1; Phone Competition, supra note 63,
at A4.
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Bill 1555 upon local exchange competition are already evident, as
Ameritech signalled that it may abandon its "Customers First" plan if
telecommunications legislation favorable to Ameritech and other BOCs is
adopted in Washington.6' Ameritech later clarified that the details of its
"Customers First" plan may be affected by pending federal legislation.'
B. Resale, Eliminating Franchise Restrictions, and Gaining
Access to Customers
Although states have opened short-haul (10XXX intraLATA) toll calls
to competitors, clearly more progress is necessary to eliminate franchise
restrictions that limit or prohibit potential competitors from entering the
local exchange market. As noted above, only a few states67 have autho-
rized local competition. Actual implementation of viable local competition
has been very limited and subject to many of the above impediments.
The local competition battle is fierce, and the stakes are high.
According to the FCC, telecommunications industry revenues rose to
$170.2 billion in 1993, including $79.4 billion from toll calls, $59.2 billion
from local service, and $31.5 billion from access charges. 8 Most of the
access service revenues represent billings of LECs to IXCs.69 Even where
franchise restrictions have been eliminated, many CAPS, IXCs, and other
alternative service providers continue to experience problems accessing
buildings, conduits, and rights-of-way. New entrants require nondiscrimina-
tory access to conduits and rights-of-way. Otherwise, prospective
competitors may need to rely on lengthy and expensive regulatory
adjudication and court litigation to gain necessary access to customers.
Absent such access, incumbent LEC local-loop facilities are often the only
readily available means of reaching customers. Thus, there should be no
restrictions on resale of the same class of telecommunications services.7 °
While access to customers through wireless technology, such as PCS,
is promising, developing PCS facilities could take years and cost billions
of dollars. Similarly, upgrading existing cable television company facilities
to digital quality-able to provide integrated voice, data, video, and
broadband capabilities-could cost more than $100 billion.7' While
65. Leslie Cauley, Ameritech May Not Open Market if Phone Bill Passes, WALL ST.
J., July 24, 1995, at B4.
66. Id.
67. See supra note 49.
68. TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY REVENUE, supra note 24, at 4; Telecommunica-
tions Industry Revenue Rose, COMM. DAILY, Jan. 3, 1995, at 5, 5.
69. TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY REVENUE, supra note 24, at 4.
70. Sievers's Testimony, supra note 19, at 34.
71. PRESERVING LONG DISTANCE COMPETITION, supra note 17, at V-16.
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providing access to existing cable subscribers, upgrading cable facilities
may not provide access to all potential customers.' Current estimates
suggest that "the investment required for the introduction of competitive
telephony ranges from $800 to $1100 per subscriber."' The network
architecture of video servers, set-top boxes, software control, and billing
systems is complex, while the lack of industry-wide standards for key
technical components (e.g., servers and network transmission protocals) is
hampering software development in critical areas, such as billing sys-
tems.74 According to the Yankee Group's financial model, the investment
for cable telephony must be cut to $500-$600 per subscriber to yield a
positive cash flow over a seven-year period.' It could cost some cable
television companies and their partners as much as $8 billion over the next
several years to implement their cable/PCS strategy.76 Some cable
companies also face poor customer service reputations, lack of customer
loyalty, high cost of cable/CAP/wireless integration, and geographically
limited CAP switching availability.7
Just as MCI, Sprint, and other new entrants to the interexchange
market offered discounts to entice customers to change service providers,
alternative local service providers may also need to offer discounts to
encourage customers to leave their current local service provider.7" If and
when cable TV companies begin to provide local dial tone service to their
customers, such customers will be reluctant to switch dial tone providers
unless they are able to retain their existing telephone number as discussed
below.
72. Sprint cable partners-TCI, Cox, and Comcast-have approximately 18 million
customers with lines passing 30 million homes. John J. Keller, Sprint Talks with Cable-TV
Concerns in Push to Expand New Wireless Venture, WALL ST. J., Jan. 26, 1995, at B8.
Eight other cable companies have signed letters of intent with Sprint, extending the Sprint
venture's coverage to nearly 40 percent of U.S. homes.
73. Cable Strategies for Competitive Telephony: Assessing the Sprint/Cable Alliance,
YANKEEVISION CONSUMER COMM., Dec. 1994, at 1, 12 [hereinafter Cable Strategies].
74. FROST & SULLIVAN, U.S. CABLE TV AND ASSOCIATED TECHNOLOGY MARKETS:
CROSS-OVER AND EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES RESHAPE THE INDUSTRY 1-7 (1995).
75. Cable Strategies, supra note 73, at 12.
76. John J. Keller, Sprint Puts Price Tag of Up to $8 Billion on Foray into Local Phone
Markets, WALL ST. J., Mar. 30, 1995, at B7.
77. THE YANKEE GROUP WIRELESS/MOBILE COMMUNICATIONS PLANNING SERVICE,
PCS: THE IMPLEMENTATION PHASE 62 (1995) [hereinafter PCS PHASE].
78. Surveys reveal that customers believe that local telephone companies provide better
network quality, reliability, and customer service than cable TV companies. Eighty-four
percent of the customers are satisfied with their local telephone service. Less than 50
percent are satisfied with their cable TV company, although 60 percent of telco subscribers
would change providers for a reduction of 10-15 percent of current rates. Cable Strategies,
supra note 73, at 12.
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C. Access Charges, Universal Service, Unbundling, and
Subsidies
Access charges account for forty-five cents per dollar of total long-
distance expenses.79 IXCs' payment of access charges to LECs to connect
to their customers through LEC facilities provides significant contribution
to LECs. Many believe that this contribution helps to keep local service
rates low, thereby fulfilling important universal service goals and helping
to ensure an available carrier of last resort.' Telephone subsidies, largely
funded by IXCs' access charge payments, are estimated to be in the range
of $17.5 to $20 billion per year."' Local competition will not become a
reality, however, unless noneconomic, embedded subsidies are eliminated.
Replacing this inequitable imbalance with cost-based prices and a universal
fund-that recovers competitively neutral contributions for basic residential
telephone service from all participants in proportion to the share of the
telecommunications market served by each telecommunications service
provider-would better promote pompetition without sacrificing important
universal service goals.' All providers of local exchange service, if
selected by customers eligible for universal service support, should have an
opportunity to receive assistance from contributed universal service
funds."
Also, when BOCs compete with long-distance carriers in providing
intraLATA toll or other services, detailed regulation and cost analysis are
necessary to ensure appropriate pricing of essential bottleneck access
79. PRESERVING LONG-DISTANCE COMPETITION, supra note 17, at 111-13; PCS PHASE,
supra note 77, at 35.
80. But see HATFIELD ASSOCIATES, THE COST OF BASIC UNIVERSAL SERVICE (1994)
(suggesting that urban, densely-populated areas may not require universal service subsidies).
81. Phone Service Subsidies Cost $17.5 Billion, Study Says, TELECOMM. REP., Jan. 16,
1995, at 32.
82. See, e.g., Sievers's Testimony, supra note 19, at 32-34; Benchmark Cost Model:
A Joint Submission by MCI Telecommunications, NYNEX, Sprint, and U.S. West, CC
Dkt. No. 80-286 (Sept. 12, 1995) (providing a benchmark estimate of the monthly cost for
providing basic teleophone services-voice-grade access to the public switched network,
residential one-party service, touch tone, white page directory listing, and access to
directory assistance, operator, and emergency services-in each Census Block Group within
a state); TELEPORT COMMUNICATIONS, GROUP, UNIVERSAL SERVICE ASSURANCE HI: A
BLUEPRINT FOR ACTION (1994) (propoging that a universal service assurance fund be set
up and administered by an independent agency and funded by all telecommunications
carriers. The size of the fund would be determined according to Total Service Long Run
Incremental Cost principles.) See also HATFIELD ASSOCIATES, supra note 80; Comments
of Sprint Corp., In Re Amend. of Pt. 36 of the Commission's Rules and Estab. of a Joint
Board, in CC Dkt. No. 80-286 (Dec. 2, 1994).
83. Sievers's Testimony, supra note 19, at 33-34.
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facilities and to avoid cross-subsidization of competitive BOC services with
revenues from noncompetitive services. Unbundled network components
(e.g., links, ports, feeders, and distribution elements) and switched access
elements are critical to enable prospective competitors to purchase only
those functionalities that they need at cost-based prices. Yet, varying
degrees of network component and access element unbundling exist in
intrastate tariffs throughout the country, further complicating the strategic
planning and purchasing decisions of would-be competitors. Parity between
interstate and intrastate access rates where intrastate access rates exceed
interstate rates, and eliminating existing access subsidies, such as the
residual interconnection and carrier common line charges, would also help
to bring switched access charges closer to cost and reduce the threat of
bypassing LEC access facilities. Tariffed nonrecurring charges, which
impose significant monetary penalties upon IXCs for switching access
suppliers, further stymie access to alternative access vendors and should be
eliminated as they are additional barriers to the development of viable local
competition.
Imputation is another critical competitive safeguard which, if properly
implemented, requires LECs to impute access charges plus the incremental
costs of providing toll services in their toll rates. Just as intraLATA toll
competition will not develop without imputation, due to a potential
anticompetitive price squeeze whereby the access rates charged to IXCs
exceed LECs' intraLATA toll rates,' local rates should also reflect
underlying costs and move toward cost-based rates subject to appropriate
universal service policies.
D. Collocation, Interconnection, and Reciprocal Intercarrier
Compensation
The recent reversal of the FCC's physical collocation rule,' which
required LECs to set aside part of their central offices for use by CAPs,
clouds the prospect of future procompetitive switched collocation policies.
Virtual collocation equivalent to physical collocation, or physical colloca-
tion at LEC tandems, central offices, and serving wire centers is critical to
interconnecting to LEC networks in a cost-efficient and technically
efficacious manner.
Switched local phone competition, particularly the ability to let
customers interconnect phone calls, is still not fully permitted in most
84. See Craig D. Dingwall, Imputation ofAccess Charges-A Prerequisitefor Effective
IntraLATA Toll Competition, 40 ADMIN. L. REV. 433 (1988).
85. Bell Atlantic Tel. Cos. v. FCC, 24 F.3d 1441 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
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states.8 6 New entrants to the local exchange market will be unable to
compete unless they can interconnect with other local service providers and
obtain cost-based nondiscriminatory interconnection to essential network
components. The lack of cost-based, reciprocal intercarrier compensation
arrangements remains a barrier to entry in many areas. 7 Absent incre-
mented cost-based interconnection rates, interim in-kind exchange
arrangements or capacity-based programs described below, new entrants
will understandably neither be attracted to markets where they pay more to
terminate calls over existing LEC facilities than they receive for calls which
terminate over their network nor to markets in which they receive little or
no compensation.
Mutual compensation for call termination should encourage competi-
tion and interconnection .while covering relevant costs, but neither
mirroring existing access charge levels, nor serving as a source of
subsidies. Existing reciprocal intercarrier compensation arrangements,
which reimburse new entrants for intercarrier calls terminated over their
networks, are generally not cost-based,"8 and often allow new entrants
little or no profit margin. Even if intercarrier compensation arrangements
were cost-based, new entrants would still have difficulty competing with
incumbent LECs' subsidized local exchange rates, because embedded loop
costs generally exceed flat residential local service rates.8 9
The "co-carrier" agreement, whereby MFS and NYNEX pay each
other for local calls completed between their networks at a rate equal to 48
86. Gary Samuels, Lord, Make Me Competitive-But Not Just Yet, FORBES, Mar. 13,
1995, at 42, 42.
87. The Connecticut DPUC ruled that interconnection will be established at points
where it is most efficient and technically feasible. At a minimum, carriers may interconnect
offices, tandems, mutually acceptable meet points or any other agreed upon location. DPUC
Investigation into the Unbundling of the Southern New England Telephone Company's
Local Telecommunications Network, (Dkt. No. 94-10-02), Decision, State of Connecticut
Dep't of Pub. Util. Control, 57 (Sept. 22, 1995); Maryland Pub. Serv. Comm'n, supra note
35. See also, In re the Application of City Signal, Inc., for an Order Establishing and
Approving Interconnection Arrangements with Ameritech Michigan, Opinion and Order,
Michigan Pub. Serv. Comm'n, Case No. U-10647 (Feb. 23, 1995) (granting US Signal
Corporation's request for co-carrier status through interim interconnection arrangements,
including a reciprocal compensation rate of .0150 per minute for terminating local calls to
each other's networks).
88. For example, the so-called Open Market Plan provides, in relevant part, that "R-
Net shall pay and receive reciprocal compensation for the exchange of local message traffic
between it and other carriers ... equal to R-Net's then-applicable access charges,"
excluding the intrastate Carrier Common Line Charge. Open Market Plan, supra note 36,
at 45-46.
89. CAROL WEINHAUS, ET AL., TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUS. ANALYSIS PROJECT,
Loop DREAMS: THE PRICE OF CONNECTION FOR LOCAL SERVICE COMPETITION
(EXECUTIVE SUMMARY) (1995).
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percent of the rate charged to end users in New York, is somewhat
encouraging. However, MFS and other new entrants have not had the same
success with other BOCs,9 and, as discussed below, the lack of true
number portability is a barrier to entry. Prodded by regulators, Ameritech
announced its plan to sign a similar deal with MFS in Chicago.9" Three
months after NYNEX and MFS reached an intercarrier compensation
agreement in New York, they agreed to pay each other one and a half cents
per minute to terminate local calls in Massachusetts. 92 This rate represents
a "half-call" concept, whereby the one and a half cents rate equals roughly
half of the NYNEX telcos' average retail, per-minute rate for an entire
local call.93 In addition, MFS will receive terminating switched access
charges on interexchange calls that terminated to MFS customers. 94
In ruling on MFS's application to operate as a local exchange carrier
in areas served by Bell Telephone of Pennsylvania in Philadelphia and
Pittsburgh,' Administrative Law Judge Robert A. Christianson concluded
that in-kind exchange ("bill and keep") 96 arrangements may be the fairest
and simplest interim measure. Some LECs challenged "bill and keep" on
constitutional grounds, claiming that it takes a portion of their networks for
public use without compensation, in violation of the Takings Clause of the
Fifth Amendment and Article I, Section 10 of the Pennsylvania Constitu-
90. Gautam Naik, Nynex Local-Phone Pact Aids Tiny Rival, WALL ST. J., Jan. 26,
1995, at B8. See Performance-Based Incentive Regulatory Plans for N.Y. Tel. Co. (Case
92-C-0665), Order Approving Performance Regulatory Plan Subject to Modification, State
of New York Pub. Serv. Comm'n, June 16, 1995. The prospective interconnection rate caps
are .0074$ end office to end office, day rate and .0098$ tandem, day rate. Id. at app. B.
91. Samuels, supra note 86, at 42.
92. MFS, NYNEX Sign Mass. Interconnection Pact, TELEcoMM. REP., Apr. 24, 1995,
at 10, 10.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Application of MFS Intelenet of Pennsylvania, Inc. for a certificate of public service
and necessity to operate as a local exchange telecommunications company in the areas
served by Bell Telephone Company of Pennsylvania within the Philadelphia and Pittsburgh
LATAs and to establish specific policies and requirements for the interconnection of
competing local exchange networks, Initial Decision, Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n, Dkt
No. A-310203F002, 6, June 6, 1995 [hereinafter Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n]. The
Pennsylvania Commission later directed MFS and Bell to negotiate a resolution of reciprocal
compensation by Oct. 31, 1995, subject to the Commission disposing of the issue by Nov.
31, 1995. Application of MFS Intelenet of Pennsylvania, Inc. for a certificate of public
convenience and necessity to operate as a local exchange telecommunications company in
the areas served by Bell Telephone Company of Pennsylvania within the Philadelphia and
Pittsburgh LATAs and to establish specific policies and requirements for the interconnection
of competing local exchange networks, Opinion and Order, Pennsylvania Pub. Util.
Comm'n, Dkt No. A-310203F002, 50-51 (Sept. 27. 1995).
96. Under "bill and keep," each carrier terminates other carriers' traffic at no charge.
The originating carrier bills the originating subscriber and keeps the billed revenues. Id.
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tion.97
The California Public Utility Commission also adopted an interim
"bill and keep" method for intercarrier compensation on local call
termination," and the Connecticut Department of Public Utility Control
ordered "bill and keep" for an initial eighteen-month period subject to true-
up for out of balance traffic situations through alternative mutual compensa-
tion plans. 99
In addition to the minutes-of-use and "bill and keep" intercarrier
compensation approaches discussed above, capacity-based programs
compensate service providers according to the cost of the capacity required
to terminate each other's traffic. Proponents of capacity-based programs
generally support interconnection rates based upon the long-run incremental
cost of capacity. Like "bill and keep," capacity-based programs can be
particularly effective in markets with flat-rate retail pricing.
E. Number Portability and Assignment
Full-service provider database local number portability," which
allows customers to change local service providers without changing
telephone numbers, has not been implemented. Meaningful local competi-
tion will not develop if customers must incur the time and expense (e.g.,
new stationary and signs) of changing their telephone number in order to
change carriers. MFS estimates that 75 percent of customers are not going
to change their phone number unless there is a significant economic benefit
for doing so, while nearly half of potential customers surveyed by MCI
said that they would not switch to new MCI local service if they could not
keep their numbers.' 0' Experience with 800 service demonstrates the
importance of full number portability, as consumers are understandably
reluctant to switch carriers when it means changing toll-free 800 telephone
numbers. For competitive local carriers, the problem of full number
97. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n, supra note 95, at 19 & nn. 54 and 55 (citing
Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 239 (1897) and Pennsylvania Central
Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) respectively).
98. Order Instituting Rulemaking on the Commission's Own Motion into Competition
for Local Exchange Service (R.95-040043); Order Instituting Investigation on the
Commission's Own Motion into Competition for Local Exchange Service (1.95-04-044),
Pub. Util. Comm'n of the State of California, Decision 95-07-054 (July 24, 1995).
99. DPUC Investigation into the Unbundling of the Southern New England Telephone
Co's Local Telecommunications Network, (Dkt. No. 94-10-02), Decision, State of
Connecticut Dep't of Pub. Util. Control 22, 23, 70, 71 (Sept. 22, 1995).
100. Geographic number portability allows the customer to change locations without
changing telephone numbers.
101. Daniel Pearl, Telephone Numbers Hang Up Local Bell Rivals, WALL ST. J., Jan.
13, 1995, at B1.
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portability is analogous to that of equal access faced by the IXCs in the
early 1980s.'1
Interim number portability solutions, such as Direct Inward Dialing
(DID) trunks, remote call forwarding (RCF), and tandem/route indexing,
are not the same as full number portability and suffer from technical and
operational deficiencies. °3 Similarly, personal phone numbers, which use
a special area code to allow people to be reached at the same number
anywhere they travel, do not allow customers to change carriers without
changing their telephone number and often have monthly service fees."°
The New York PSC recently endorsed a six month full (database) local
number portability trial, scheduled to begin in February 1996, and several
state commission-initiated committees are working on a full local number
protability solution. During the Rochester Telephone Open Market Plan
hearings, however, the New York PSC staff estimated that it could take up
to five years to deploy necessary full number portability technologies."
Similarly, the Yankee Group believes that it will be several years before
customers nationwide can change their local telephone provider as
transparently as they now change their long-distance carrier under equal
access. 106
The FCC recently moved to take a leadership role in the local number
portability debate by initiating a broad notice of proposed rulemaking in
102. Heather Burnett Gold, Local Number Portability: The Key to True Local Exchange
Competition, Presentation to NECA/Pacific Telesis Access Demand Meeting (Dec. 8,
1994).
103. DID delivers calls via DID trunks to the terminating carriers' switch for processing.
With RCF, the incumbent carrier forwards the original number to the new carrier's number.
Tandem/Route indexing, a combination of RCF and DID, uses a tandem switch as a hub
to route calls. DID trunking and RCF increase call setup time, do not support provision of
CLASS-type features (e.g., Caller-ID), are not suitable for data transmission, require
additional switching and transport costs, preclude direct connection between new local
exchange providers and IXCs, and require continued dependence on the incumbent carrier.
In addition, DID requires new entrants to incur additional costs from interconnecting at each
end office from which numbers are "ported," and RCF requires two telephone numbers for
each ported number, thereby accelerating the exhaustion of NXXs and NPAs. The Level
Playing Field: An Interim Report, State of New York Dep't of Pub. Serv., Case 94-C-0095
(Module 2), 19 (Sept. 1, 1994).
104. See Sandra Sugawara, For a Price, You're Numbered for Life, WASH. POST, Jan.
5, 1995, at Fl.
105. Brief of Sprint Comm. Co. L.P. at 10, Petition of Rochester Tel. Corp. for
Approval of Proposed Restructuring Plan (Case 93-C-0103) and Petition of Rochester Tel.
Corp. for Approval of a New Multi Year Rate Stability Agreement (Case 93-C-0033), State
of New York Pub. Serv. Comm'n., (Aug. 26, 1994).
106. Cable Strategies, supra note 73, at 13.
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Docket 95-116.17 In its notice, the FCC said that "number portability
appears to offer substantial public interest benefits because it provides
consumers personal mobility and flexibility in the way they use their
telecommunications services, and because it fosters competition among
service providers."' 8 The FCC further stated that "its rulemaking is the
first step in developing a national number portability policy and sought
comment on whether it should adopt specific rules promoting the
development of number portability and what those rules should be."'"
New entrants should also have nondiscriminatory access to blocks of
telephone numbers (NXXs), databases (e.g., directory assistance, LIDB,
advanced intelligent network, and 800-number databases), 911, telephone
relay, telephone directories, and operator services necessary to offer
service. NXX codes, currently assigned through Bell Communications
Research, 110 should be assigned by an independent administrator to
promote rapid, nondiscriminatory access to such codes.
E Dialing Parity
Although customers can place intraLATA toll calls over their IXC of
choice by dialing a so-called 1OXXX five digit access code before dialing
the number they are calling, the same intraLATA toll call can be placed
over LEC facilities without dialing such an access code. IXCs and others
charge that this disparity amounts to unequal access. Only a few states have
authorized 1 + intraLATA toll competition,"' and, even where authorized,
107. FCC Initiates Rulemaking on Local Number Portability, TELCO COMPETrrMON REP.,
July 20, 1995, at 1, 1.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. At divestiture, Bellcore was created when AT&T transferred assets to a newly
formed organization that would supply the technical and nontechnical functions to the BOCs
that were previously provided by AT&T. See generally, United States v. Western Elec.
Co., 569 F. Supp. 1057, 1118-19 (D.C. Cir. 1983). Several BOCs are considering selling
Bellcore. See Leslie Cauley, Baby Bells Propose to Sell Off Bellcore In Move to Resolve
Conflicting Interests, WALL ST. J., Oct. 10, 1994, at A3.
111. 1 +intraLATA presubscription allows consumers to presubscribe their intraLATA
toll carrier, just as they currently select their interLATA long-distance carrier. As of the
publication deadline for this Article, intraLATA presubscription has been ordered in
Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota, New York, North Dakota,
Ohio, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. "Iowa, Minnesota, and South Dakota have allowed
independent companies to implement 1+intraLATA presubscription networks."
Investigation into IntraLATA Presubscription: Before the New Jersey Board of Public
Utilities, Dkt. No. TX 9409388, 8 & nn. 1-2, Apr. 10, 1995 (direct testimony of Michael
J. Nelson on behalf of United Tel. Co. of NJ, Inc. and Sprint Comm. Co. L.P.). Arizona,
California, Delaware, Georgia, Idaho, Kansas, Massachusetts, Montana, New Jersey,
Oregon, Pennsylvania, Texas, Virginia, and Washington "are actively studying 1 +intra-
LATA presubscription issues." Id.
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it is generally being phased in slowly due to technical considerations and
implementation delays. For example, although the New York PSC
approved 1+intraLATA presubscription several months ago, NYNEX-
NY's initial customer contact procedures stated that NYNEX-NY
representatives will not initiate discussion about intraLATA presubscription
with end user customers, will not provide information about other
intraLATA carriers to customers, and will not accept requests to change
intraLATA service providers directly from the customer.' '2 Several IXCs
and other parties challenged NYNEX-NY's proposed customer contact
procedures at the New York PSC, and revised procedures are under
consideration.
G. Differential Regulation
Regulation should correspond to market power. BOCs which have
significant market power and are able to leverage control of essential
bottleneck facilities should be subject to greater regulatory oversight than
nascent new entrants with little or no market power. As long as there is no
parity in the marketplace, parity of regulation is inappropriate. For
example, certification and regulatory requirements for new entrants, such
as geographic service coverage and cost-based, economic regulation (e.g.,
cost studies), are inappropriate for new entrants which lack market power.
Similarly, price lists in lieu of tariffs may be appropriate for new entrants,
subject to making the terms and conditions of service offerings available for
public inspection upon request.
IV. JURISDICTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
With the convergence of technology and telecommunications, cable
and other industries' jurisdictional lines have blurred while turf battles have
grown. Just as telephone companies want to provide video services over
their networks,"' cable television companies want to provide local
telephone services over their facilities. Some IXCs have demonstrated an
interest in providing entertainment and content-related services, while
media firms are searching for alternative distribution channels for their
programming. Moreover, some electric companies have demonstrated an
interest in upgrading their facilities to provide communications-like
112. See generally Sprint's Complaint filed with the New York Pub. Serv. Comm'n
(Case Nos. 28425 and 92-C-0665) (Track II) (June 23, 1995).
113. From 1994 through May 1995, 24,644 homes were involved in 15 U.S. Telco
Video-on-Demand trials involving 14 companies. Judith S. Lockwood, Dialing For Dollars:
Vdeo Dial Tone, CONVERGENCE, May 1995, at 19, 19.
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services.14 This cornucopia of convergence has manifested itself in
multiple mergers and alliances, including the failed Bell Atlantic/TCI
merger, the Sprint venture with several cable companies, the MCI/News
Corp. partnership, and the AT&T/McCaw merger.
In the wake of this activity, federal, state, and local jurisdictional lines
often clash and further complicate the transition to competition. As noted
above, under the Decree, the states continue to regulate intrastate
telecommunications matters, including intrastate intraLATA and local
competition issues. In opposition to MFS Communications' petition asking
the FCC to direct LECs to unbundle the local loop portion of local
exchange networks, several state regulators and LECs argued that the
Communications Act does not give the FCC authority to establish a federal
unbundling mandate that would result in improper preemption of state
authority over local networks."' The New York Department of Public
Service said it is "firmly committed to encouraging competition" through
a "federal-state partnership," but opposed federal rulemaking "on the
grounds that the Commission's jurisdiction does not extend to requiring the
unbundling of local-loop facilities."" 6 The Department of Public Service
pointed out that Section 152(b)(1) of the Communications Act preserves
states' jurisdiction over services, charges, facilities, and practices "for or
in connection with intrastate communications services.""' The Depart-
ment of Public Service also noted that the U.S. Supreme Court, in
Louisiana PSC v. FCC,"' ruled that the FCC's authority over interstate
facilities does not entitle it to preempt the states, even if state regulations
"frustrate" an FCC policy goal."' Competitive local service providers
and some IXCs supported the MFS proposal but urged the FCC to go
beyond unbundling to address intercarrier compensation and local numberportability. 120
Similar jurisdictional issues with respect to service provider local
number portability, database administration, reciprocal interconnection
rates, and other critical components for a competitive market are likely,
depending upon the outcome of federal telecommunications legislation.
Even absent federal legislation, FCC preemption may be appropriate for
114. For example, Kansas City Power and Light announced a program to install wireless
meter-reading devices in Kansas City.
115. States, LECs Slam MFS Petition on Unbundling of Local Loops, TELCO
COMPETITION REP., Apr. 27, 1995, at 3-4 [hereinafter MFS Petition].
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Louisiana PSC, 476 U.S. 355 (1986).
119. MFS Petition, supra note 115, at 3-4.
120. 1d.
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certain issues, such as local number portability, which require a national
solution where it is impossible for conflicting federal and state regulations
to coexist,121 or where a conflicting state policy "would unavoidably
affect the federal policy adversely.""
The blurring of lines of demarcation among cable, telephony, and
computer services creates additional jurisdictional challenges. The provision
of customer premises equipment (CPE), inside wiring, and enhanced
services by traditionally nontelephony service providers further raise
jurisdictional issues. The ability of the FCC and the states to exercise
regulatory authority over noncarriers is yet to be fully explored by the
courts. 1'3
In addition to obtaining appropriate reciprocal interconnection rates,
gaining access to rights-of-way is one of the most significant hurdles to
overcome in the "race" toward a competitive local telecommunications
market. Within the last fifteen years, interexchange carriers have spent
billions of dollars building or upgrading their networks, obtaining zoning
approvals and waivers, and gaining access to rights-of-way. Prospective
competitors in the local exchange market will likely have a similar
experience. For example, to cover the nation, PCS players will have to
build 100,000 cell sites, including thousands of towers. 24 The effort will
require leasing rooftops and plots of land, clearing thousands of complex
zoning rules, and allaying the fears of hundreds of neighborhood
groups."n Compliance with local ordinances and/or obtaining waivers
from local jurisdictions will be costly and time consuming.
The pending comprehensive federal telecommunications legislation,
if it becomes law, could have a significant impact upon the jurisdictional
balance. Not surprisingly, the Clinton Administration and interexchange
carriers generally support, while BOCs oppose, a continuing role for
federal oversight in determining whether a particular market has become
competitive such that BOCs may start providing in-region interexchange
services."' Federal oversight will clearly require coordination with state
121. See California v. FCC, 39 F.3d 919, 933 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct.
1427 (1995). See also Jonathan Nadler, Give Peace A Chance: FCC-State Relations After
California 11I, 47 FED. COMM. L.J. 457, 495 (1995).
122. Computer & Communications Indus. Ass'n v. FCC, 693 F.2d 198, 216 (D.C. Cir.
1982).
123. Nadler, supra note 121, at 507-08.
124. Gautam Naik, A Lot of Little Hassles Slow Spread of Wireless Network, WALL ST.
J., May 11, 1995, at B1.
125. Id.
126. Woller, supra note 60, at 4B. Section 245 of H.R. 1555, in its present form,
provides for FCC review of compliance with federally mandated requirements for state PUC
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and local jurisdictions as to the type of services provided, the type and
amount of traffic carried by alternative service providers, infrastructure
development, market entrants, and barriers to entry.
Even with the prospect of broad, preemptive federal legislation, it will
ultimately be up to the states to implement such policies and report on the
status of local competition within their respective jurisdictions. For
example, the so-called "manager's amendment" to House Bill 1555 clarifies
that the FCC's rules on equal access and interconnection do not preclude
the enforcement of state rules or regulations on access and interconnection
that are consistent with the requirements of "the Act."" z Avoiding a
patchwork of different levels of competitive entry and barriers to entry will
require collaboration and a national local competition policy.
V. FEDERAL AND STATE LOCAL COMPETITION POLICIES
Given the varied state regulatory and legislative local competition
proposals, the prospect of pending federal telecommunications legislation
becoming law, and the possibility of different rules and requirements in
multiple jurisdictions, the need for a coordinated approach is clear. It is far
from certain whether pending federal legislation will become law this year,
or what form such legislation, if and when it becomes law, ultimately will
take. Equally uncertain is the extent to which federal telecommunications
legislation, if and when it becomes law, will preempt state rules and
franchise restrictions which might otherwise stifle the development of local
competition or complicate a uniform federal policy. One thing that is clear,
however, is the need for a national local competition policy.
There should be actual, effective, and demonstrable local competition;
and competitive benchmark criteria, such as those proposed by Anne
Bingaman, that should be satisfied before the interLATA line of business
restriction is removed. Rather than a premature removal of this line of
business restriction, the requirements of Senate Bill 652 must also be
satisfied prior to an effectively competitive local telecommunications
market. Absent continuing federal court review over the MFJ waiver
process, a strong antitrust role for the U.S. Department of Justice in
reviewing BOC proposals to enter the long-distance market is critical to
foster the development of switched local competition.
While there is no perfect bright-line market share test for determining
when there is actual, effective local competition, consumers' ability to
verification of BOC entry into the interLATA market. See H.R. 1555, supra note 6.
127. Summary of Manager's Amendment to HR 1555, TELECOMM. REP., Aug. 7, 1995,
at 5, 5-7.
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obtain local telephone services from alternative providers that are
economically, technically, and functionally equivalent to those of the
incumbent LEC provider is critical. Where there are no economically,
technically, and functionally equivalent local service alternatives,
safeguards similar to those discussed above and U.S. Department of Justice
oversight are necessary for a competitive local exchange market.
Even with preemptive federal legislation, local competition policies
will likely take several months or years to implement and could be subject
to protracted litigation. If federal preemptive telecommunications legislation
becomes law, federal, state, and local coordination will be particularly
critical to address implementation, service quality, and complaint issues.
At the Federal-State-Local Telecom Summit, Vice-President Albert
Gore announced that federal, state, and local regulators have agreed to
abide by set objectives that will guide future regulatory and policy efforts,
including promoting competition as the best stimulus for innovation and
efficiency. This confirmed the need for open access to local telephone
networks and affirmed the importance of universal service." At the
Summit, representatives from all levels of government agreed that any
federal telecommunications legislation passed this year should provide a
general framework within which state and local regulators could operate
and which grants a greater degree of state and local regulatory authority
over telecommunications companies.
Projects are underway to harmonize state regulations. 29 Many state
and local regulators and legislators are advocating their interests at the
federal level with respect to proposed federal legislation, and they likely
will be called upon to apply their extensive knowledge of their markets and
experience to implement any national local telecommunications policies.
Notwithstanding the prospect of preemptive federal telecommunications
laws addressing local competition issues, the FCC and the states should
continue to expand coordination through the Joint Board process to address
critical local and switched access competition issues and safeguards. State
regulators already participate in the Joint Board which provides substantial
input into the FCC's universal service policies and could provide similar
128. The U.S. Department of Commerce hosted the Federal-State-Local Telecom Summit
on January 9, 1995.
129. For example, the Southern Growth Policies Board, sponsored by governors of 13
Southern states, initiated a project to identify policy recommendations for the regional
harmonization of state regulations among the several states. The NARUC Communications
Committee formed a work group to identify issues and to establish principles to assist states
in assessing and implementing policies on local competition. James Bradford Ramsay,
IntraLATARegulatory Developments, Address at the NECA-Pacific Telesis Access-Demand
Conference (Dec. 7-9, 1994).
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input on other unresolved local competition issues.
Notwithstanding the recently passed bills in the House and Senate, but
not yet approved by the President, many believe that the course of
telecommunications regulation will largely be decided outside of Washing-
ton. 3' Any federal telecommunications legislation, if and when it
becomes law, will likely set broad outlines for competition, rather than
dictate every detail."' In addition, significant telecommunications
regulatory and legislative changes, such as those previously discussed in
this Article, have already occurred and will continue to develop in the
states and at the local level. While prompt adoption and implementation of
federal telecommunications laws described above are critical to the orderly
development of local competition, collaboration among federal, state, and
local regulators and legislators will likely be necessary to implement a
national, local competition policy.
CONCLUSION
The rapid pace of technological telecommunications developments and
consumers' demand for seamless telecommunications services demonstrate
the need for a national telecommunications policy. Competition for local
telephone service is in the very early stages of development. Barriers to
entry must be eliminated, and safeguards must be established in order to
foster a competitive environment. The MFJ's restriction on BOCs
providing interLATA services should not be lifted until there is actual,
effective, and demonstrable local competition, such that customers have
access to alternative providers of economically, technically, and functional-
ly equivalent local services. Although many of the switched local exchange
competition details are being developed in the states, broad federal
telecommunications laws consistent with the guidelines described in this
Article are necessary. Collaboration among federal, state, and local
officials to implement a national local competition policy may also help to
eliminate barriers to entry and to establish minimum safeguards to foster
a competitive, local telecommunications market.
130. Telecoms Deregulation, Competition Calling, THE ECONOMIST, July 1, 1995, at 59,
59.
131. Id.
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